How much efficiency gains and price reductions for an efficiency defense? 'Quanto Basta' by Fabrizi, Simona & Lippert, Steffen
How much eﬃciency gains and price reductions to put as
ingredients into an eﬃciency defense?
’Quanto Basta’∗
Simona Fabrizi† Steﬀen Lippert‡
January 2005
UPV - DFAEII Working Paper 2004-04
Abstract
Potential eﬃciency gains due to a merger can be used by competition authorities to judge
upon proposed mergers. In a world where agents’ eﬀorts, observable or unobservable, aﬀect the
success of a production cost reducing project that may be conducted as a stand-alone ﬁrm or
in a merger, we characterize the merger decision and the type of errors a competition authority
m a ym a k ew h e ni tr e l i e so na ne ﬃciency defense. In addition, we show that the occurrence of
either type of errors is always smaller under the unobservable eﬀorts assumption, than under
the observable eﬀorts one.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years, a wave of horizontal mergers has occurred giving rise to more concentrated mar-
ket structures in many industries. Historically, such a higher concentration has been viewed as
detrimental to welfare as it often leads to a reduction of competitiveness in the respective market.
However, mergers usually do not only have an impact on the output market side but also on the
production processes, the organizational structures, the relations to suppliers of intermediate inputs
or even on the ﬁnancial resources of the ﬁrms through a relaxation of credit constraints. The eﬀects
of mergers can be better understood when one looks at what drives the decisions of ﬁrms about
whether to merge or not. On the one side, we may think that potential synergies, eﬃciency gains,
reduction of internal organizational costs or the increase of market power are considered positively
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1by merging parties. On the other side, concerns about the future division of control rights, the loss
in control over the actions of the management, conﬂicts about the sharing of potential proﬁts may
be responsible for potential merger not to come to existence.
In our paper, with their merger decision, the merging parties trade oﬀ between on the one
hand potential synergies, the coordination of implemented eﬀorts through the incentives within the
merged ﬁrm, as well as the increase of market power and, on the other hand, the loss in control
over the actions of the management. Potential synergies and the coordination of the implemented
eﬀorts within the ﬁrm(s) are responsible for lower expected unit production costs and, thus, are
also beneﬁcial for social welfare.
Thus, as for both, proﬁts and social welfare, there may be positive and negative eﬀects from a
merger, it is far from clear whether a merger is beneﬁcial, not only from a private, but also from
a social point of view. There may exist, thus, a need for competition authorities to discriminate
between mergers that are harmful to the society’s objective functions either the consumers’ surplus
or the social welfare, from the ones that instead may enhance either of them.
In their decisions on horizontal merger cases, competition authorities may accept a so called
eﬃciency defense, according to which they can allow mergers on the basis of "merger speciﬁc,
substantial eﬃciency gains that are likely to be passed on to consumers via price reductions1"
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 and 2001, provide an excellent assessment of this eﬃciency defense
analyzing eﬃciency gains in horizontal mergers). The US Antitrust Law allows explicitly for this
defense, and, even though the European Competition Law does not explicitly account for it, it is
not incompatible with the use of it. The rationale behind allowing for an eﬃciency defense is that
mergers usually do not only have an impact on the competitiveness of the market for the products
sold by the parties but also on their production processes and their organizational structures. This
paper takes this rationale literally and models the eﬀects of an eﬃciency defense if the eﬃciency
gains are endogenously determined through incentives to innovate with and without the merger.
Merging parties have the burden of proving whether eﬃciencies can be reached according to
the US Antitrust law, while in Europe the competition authorities are responsible for collecting
and processing the relevant information to justify their decision upon a merger. This is a diﬃcult
task for both, the merging parties and the competition authorities. The merging parties very often
are not able to produce the hard evidence for potential eﬃciency gains, and, on the other side, the
competition authority cannot judge perfectly upon other possible conﬁg u r a t i o n sa st h ei n f o r m a t i o n
that it possesses comes often from the merging parties themselves. There exist attempts to measure
the eﬃciency gains that a merger would lead to. However, the eﬃciency gains considered in these
studies are especially the ones associated with decreases in the production costs, transaction costs,
or with the internalization of costs that cancel out within the merged entity eventually.
To our best knowledge, no attempt exists to qualify the costs parties may have to incur for
compensating managerial eﬀort for reducing production costs before and after a merger and thereby
to endogenize the eﬃciency gains from a merger through implemented optimal contracts.
This paper is an attempt to do so. We allow for eﬃciency gains that come from the implemen-
1See e.g. the FTC 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, section 4.
2tation of optimal eﬀort levels of the management, which, in a merger, can exploit synergies on the
managers’ eﬀorts. This is done by considering ﬁrms willing to pursue a production cost reducing
project to be conducted by managers, either in a stand-alone situation or in a merger. Agents are
able to aﬀect the success of the project, therefore, to aﬀect the realized costs in the industry and
their eﬀorts are either observable or unobservable.
We determine the private decision to merge as a function of the interaction between these
agents’ eﬀorts when they work together in a merger, as compared to the stand-alone situation,
as well as the parameters of the industry, such as the initial costs ﬁrms face, and the potential
for cost reduction. We show that mergers are privately chosen either when the potential for cost
reduction is low, i.e. due to pure market power considerations, or when managerial eﬀorts are close
substitutes, or slight duplicates, i.e. when synergies induced by implemented contracts are present.
Once the private decision has been obtained, we match it with its impact on both standards, the
consumers’ surplus and the social welfare. Even though it is often argued that using either measure
does not make a diﬀerence in practice2, we study both, as competition authorities often seem to
care about consumers’ surplus, whereas economists often consider the overall social welfare impact
instead. We will discuss more in detail the motivation behind this choice as well as the impact of
privately taken decisions over either standards in the section devoted to the policy analysis.
Results will show that an eﬃciency defense based on potential eﬃciency gains due to a merger is
g e n e r a l l yt o ol a xar e q u i r e m e n t− some bad mergers would be accepted − for the observable eﬀorts
case, and, for both informational assumptions, when the initial costs are not too high. Requiring
substantial eﬃciency gains may reduce this distortion for these mentioned cases. However, requiring
substantial eﬃciency gains for either the unobservable case when initial costs are high, or for a larger
range of costs when the standard used is the social welfare, may be too strict: some good mergers
would be refused. As a general result, eﬃciency gains and decreased expected prices guarantee
an enhancement in both consumers’ surplu sa n ds o c i a lw e l f a r em o r eo f t e nw h e ne ﬀorts are not
observable. The reason is that under moral hazard, the ﬁrms choose to merge more often for
market power reasons and less often in order to exploit synergies than if they do not face moral
hazard. As a result, it will be necessary to use the two requirements ’quanto basta’. One of the
contributions of this paper is to deﬁne what is ’quanto basta’.
Our work is mainly related to three diﬀerent strands of literature. First, it is connected to the
literature on research joint ventures and R&D cooperation in the spirit of Kamien, Muller, and
Zang (1992) and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). As in Kamien et al., we also characterize a
project as a reduction in the associated production costs of a good, even though in our model this
project does not necessarily come in the form of joint R&D: when ﬁrms decide to stay alone, they
can conduct this project separately as well. Second, our work is in line with a recent literature on
the endogenous formation of partnerships for speciﬁc projects, as e.g. the work of Espinosa and
Macho-Stadler (2003). However, our function for the probability of success of the project includes a
2Motta (2004) argues that "[...] Article 2.1 of the Merger Regulation accepts in principle an eﬃciency defense
"provided that it is to consumers’ advantage". These provisions might indicate that consumer welfare is among the
ultimate objectives of competition law. However, I am not aware of any statement of the ECJ on this point, nor of
any (Commission or Court’s) decision where reliance on either standard has made a diﬀerence in practice."
3parameter that captures how the managers/agents work together, i.e. the degree of substitutability
of their eﬀorts in the ”production” of the success of the project. With this approach we depart
from the standard literature on joint projects allowing for eﬀorts to be substitutes, duplicates or
complements. This allows us to consider more than one speciﬁc degree of complementarity between
agents’ eﬀorts as it has been extensively studied for example in the team production literature; and
also does it not limit us to functional forms where agents’ eﬀorts have to duplicate necessarily
in a very speciﬁc way as it is the case in the literature that looks at the incentives for external
monitoring of projects to be ﬁnanced which could be given either to one or more banks3.
We furthermore diﬀer from the existing literature on endogenous partnership formation in our
way of using a principal-agent-framework as opposed to a double-sided moral hazard one. A third
related strand of literature is the principal-agent literature. We use Rogerson’s (1985) ﬁrst order
approach to the ”standard” agency models with hidden action. Given a conﬁguration, agents take a
non-observable action from a continuous interval which inﬂuences the expected payoﬀ of the project.
Principals write contracts on the realization of the payoﬀ and reward agents accordingly. In the case
of joint projects with multiple agents, we use the multi-agent single principal framework common to
the moral hazard in teams literature. Important work on incentives and team production includes
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982). A closely related work from that literature is
Itoh’s (1991) paper on endogenous team production. He shows that giving incentives to help, i.e.
inducing team production, is optimal if own eﬀort and helping eﬀort are complementary. Contrary
to his approach, we do not model complementarity/substitutability coming from the form of the
agents’ disutility of providing eﬀort. In our model instead, eﬀorts are substitutes to a varying
degree in the probability of success they induce.
In the way we allow for diﬀerent degrees of substitutability between agents’ eﬀorts we adopt the
modelling used in Fabrizi and Lippert (2005). In that paper we compare the organizational choice
of entrepreneurs pursuing a product innovation project, either alone or jointly, in the absence of
moral hazard behavior on their agents’ side with that in the presence of moral hazard. Contrary
to the product innovation approach considered there, in the present paper, we instead allow for a
process innovation and market power considerations are made possible as a consequence so that,
in addition, we are able to provide insights on the policy implications of mergers.
In this paper, even though we allow for the management to be responsible of the possible
synergies that may arise though a merger, the management is not able to decide directly whether
a merger is going to take place or not. When the management is allowed to enter actively this
type of decisions, additional constraints to the ones we will explore in this analysis will have to be
considered. This is done by Lippert (2005) where the management proposes the mergers at the
ﬁrst place and possesses superior information on the synergies and, therefore, the proﬁtability that
a merger can bring about.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model, section 3 is
devoted to the private decision of ﬁrms about the merger, without and with moral hazard, section
4 considers the policy analysis, and section 5 concludes.
3See Holmström and Tirole (1997)
42 The model
We consider a situation where a good with demand Q =1− P is exchanged in an economy. This
good is initially produced by two ﬁrms i =1 ,2 at a unit production cost equal to c ≤ 14.E a c h
ﬁrm employs one agent. We assume that there exists a project that in the case of success leads
to a lower unit production cost βc, with β ∈ [0,1[. The probability of success of the project thus
measures the capacity of a given ﬁrm to reduce its unit production costs.
The project can be conducted by each ﬁrm alone − we will refer to this case as a stand-alone
situation, (S) − or together with the other ﬁrm by merging. If each ﬁrm conducts the project
alone, then each project will be conducted by one agent. However, if ﬁrms decide to merge, the
agents previously employed by each ﬁrm will work jointly in the project − we will refer to this case
as a merger, (M).
In our model, the agent(s) aﬀect the probability of success or failure of the project they conduct
through their chosen eﬀort. Depending on the assumptions on the observability of eﬀorts, this may
result in a moral hazard problem. We assume both: The agents exert either an observable or a
non observable, therefore not-contractible, eﬀort ei which is a continuous choice from the interval
[0,1].E x e r t i n gt h i se ﬀort ei implies a disutility for the agent that is equal to ci (ei)=1
2e2
i.A g e n t s
receive a transfer ti from their respective ﬁrm (stand-alone case) or from the merged entity (joint
project). They are risk neutral and their utility is additively separable between eﬀort and money,
Ui = ui (ti) − ci (ei)=ti − 1
2e2
i. However, we assume that agents have limited liability so that for
any state of nature they have to receive a non-negative transfer.
In the next subsections we will describe the possible conﬁgurations that these decisions may
lead to.
2.1 Pre-merger or stand-alone
In this case, two separate ﬁrms i =1 ,2, competing à la Bertrand, decide to undertake each the pro-
duction cost reducing project on their own. Each ﬁrm employs one agent. The success probability
of each project undertaken is deﬁned as pi (S)=ei, i.e. is equal to the eﬀort exerted by agent i.
We assume the probabilities of success in the two ﬁrms to be independent.
Given the Bertrand competition assumption, a ﬁrm receives a non-zero gross proﬁto n l yi fi t s
own project succeeds while the one of the other ﬁrm does not. Given this assumption, the eﬃciency
on the production side of the economy will be given by:
E(S)=p1 (S)+p2 (S) − p1 (S)p2 (S)
The success of one ﬁrm may lead to either a drastic or a non-drastic innovation.
It is drastic when the monopoly price associated to it is lower than the initial unit production
costs, i.e.:
4We normalize the level of the initial cost such that it varies between zero and one. It is positive, but it cannot




≤ c ⇔ β ≤
2c − 1
c
If it is, the succeeding ﬁrm can charge the monopoly price while the other one exits because at
that price it cannot recover its costs.
If it is non-drastic, the succeeding ﬁrm can charge a price at most equal to the cost of the rival
ﬁrm. In this case, we assume the unsuccessful ﬁrm not to make any sales5.
Firms may face a drastic or non-drastic innovation, depending on the combinations of the
parameters β and c. As these parameters can take values between zero and one, it is straightforward
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If both ﬁrms have either a high production cost, i.e. both projects fail, or a low production
cost, i.e. both projects succeed, they both charge a price equal to their marginal costs and make
zero gross proﬁts.
As discussed before, the probabilities of success of each ﬁrm are independent of each other, so
that for each of the four diﬀerent states of nature (failure of one ﬁrm while the other does not, and,
vice versa, failure of both, success of both of them) we can associate the following probabilities:
Pr(βc,c)=e1 (1 − e2), Pr(c,βc)=( 1− e1)e2, Pr(c,c)=( 1− e1)(1− e2), and Pr(βc,βc)=e1e2.
Given these assumptions, w.l.o.g. we can write the proﬁto fﬁrm 1, gross of the transfer to be
paid to its agent, as follows:
π1 (·,·)=

     





c(1 − c)(1− β)





















Let us characterize now also the corresponding levels of consumers’ surplus, CS(.,.), associated
with each possible state of nature:
5This assumption is the limit case for the successful ﬁrm pricing slightly below the rival’s high cost which would
induce it to exit the market.
6CS(·,·)=

    
















Note that in the stand-alone situation, a process innovation never makes consumers worse oﬀ:i t
always leads to a (at least weak) consumers’ surplus increase as compared to the situation without
the innovation.
As already introduced, the consumers’ surplus will be used in our analysis as one possible
objective function the competition authority cares about. The alternative objective function that
we will consider will be the social welfare. The social welfare will be deﬁned as the sum of consumers’
surplus, proﬁts, and the agents’ utility. We will describe both objective functions in detail later on
when introducing the policy analysis.
We will consider two cases regarding the ability to write contracts contingent on agents’ actions.
In one case, contracts can be written contingent on the agents’ exerted eﬀorts and the ﬁrms just






In the other case, contracts cannot be made contingent on the agents’ eﬀorts but only on the
realized costs, either c or βc. From standard principal-agent theory, we know that it is optimal for
the bonus paid to an agent not to be a function of the cost realizations of the other ﬁrm. Therefore,
contracts will only be such that agent i will receive a positive bonus, bi, in case ﬁrm i succeeds
in reducing its costs, or a transfer equal to zero, in case ﬁrm i fails in reducing them instead,
no matter whether the other ﬁrm succeeded or not. The limited liability of the agents we have
assumed, means that ﬁrms cannot oﬀer any contract that might pay a negative wage to their agent





if (βc,c) or (βc,βc)
otherwise.
2.2 Merger
When ﬁrms merge we consider that the previously employed agents undertake the project jointly,







1−ε with ε ∈ [ε,ε].
6We use the same deﬁnition of the probability of success here as in Fabrizi and Lippert (2005), where agents work
together in a joint research project.
7The parameter ε captures the degree of substitutability between agents’ eﬀorts. As discussed
in the introduction, diﬀerent degrees of substitutability will be considered: agents’ eﬀorts can be
either perfect substitutes, or slight complements, or duplicates. This is done, in order to account
for possible synergies between agents’ eﬀorts, as agents work together in the merged entity. We
characterize the probability of success using values of the parameter ε that are bounded below
and above. The upper bound is necessary to rule out cases where agents’ eﬀorts would be too
complementary, because otherwise the assumption that the project could have been undertaken
s e p a r a t e l yb ye a c hﬁrm would not be consistent anymore. The lower bound is imposed to guarantee
that the second order conditions of the maximization problems we will consider are satisﬁed. In
addition, we will always check for the conditions such that this measure of probability is well
deﬁned, i.e. never exceeds the value of one.
Pure synergies, which are merger speciﬁc, are the ones that are able to generate, for the same
level of inputs, a higher output. In our case, we will have merger speciﬁc synergies whenever the
induced eﬃciency by a merger, E(M), is higher as compared to the expected one induced by a







1−ε ≥ e1 + e2 − e1e2 = E(S).
As u ﬃcient condition for having synergies through a merger is that the parameter ε takes values
between zero and one. This is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition as lower values than zero
m i g h tp r o d u c es o m em e r g e rs p e c i ﬁc synergies for special combinations of high levels of both agents’
eﬀorts. In addition, it can be shown that higher values than one never produce any synergy.
However, given that in our model we will solve for the optimal contracts that induce a certain
level of agents’ eﬀorts, ex-post the inputs (optimal eﬀorts) in a stand-alone situation may take
diﬀerent values from the ones in a merger situation. Because of this, we will need to distinguish
between ex-ante synergies and ex-post ones: the ﬁrst ones refer to the deﬁnition just given and
the second ones refer to the same condition where the optimal levels of eﬀorts have been replaced
instead.
Once we have deﬁned the probability of success induced by a merger, we can concentrate as
before on the proﬁts, prices, consumers’ surplus, social welfare and the transfers agents receive
which are associated with it.
When merging, ﬁrms enjoy monopoly proﬁts on the product market, no matter whether the
merged entity succeeds in reducing its production costs or not. Only the magnitude of the proﬁts
will be aﬀected by the success or failure of this project. Thus the proﬁte n j o y e db yt h em e r g e d









i.e. either high or low, depending on whether the merger respectively succeeds or not in reducing
its unit production costs. Here we diﬀer from the assumption made in Fabrizi and Lippert (2005)
8and Lippert (2005). In those papers, a product innovation project is considered, the failure of which
brings a zero proﬁti na n yc o n ﬁguration.
As we consider mergers among equals, we assume that, once merged, merging parties share
equally the overall monopolistic proﬁt. Thus, assuming an equal sharing of the realized proﬁts of
a merger, we implicitly disregard the way merging parties come to such a sharing.



















As before, the consumers’ surplus, as well as the social welfare that we will discuss in detail when
looking at the policy analysis, will be alternatively used in our analysis as the objective functions
the competition authority cares about.
Let us ﬁnally characterize the transfers the agents get within a merger. As before, we will need
to distinguish whether the eﬀorts are observable or unobservable in order to let the transfer to the
agents be contingent or not on their respective exerted eﬀort. If contracts can be written contingent













As before, limited liability on the agents’ side is assumed so that the minimum transfer agents
can get even when there is no success is non-negative.
3P r i v a t e d e c i s i o n
3.1 No Moral Hazard
The goal of this section is to isolate the market power eﬀects from the ones that would be driven by
pure moral hazard behavior merging parties have to face when deciding about merging or not and
which type of contract to propose to the agent(s). In this section we characterize the maximization
problems ﬁrms face in a world without moral hazard.
7Giving the same bonus to both agents can be shown to result from cost minimization. We assume it for exposi-
tional purposes.
93.1.1 Stand-alone, (S)
T h i si st h ec a s ew h e r et w oﬁrms decide each to let their respective agent conduct the project alone.
The success probability of this project is therefore pi (S)=ei, with i =1 ,2.
For notational simplicity, we will refer to the gross proﬁts π(·,·) as deﬁned above when describing
the pre-merger case: they are a function of each state of nature and also depend on the combination
of the parameters that lead to a drastic or a non-drastic success, β and c. The advantage of using
this notation is that it encompasses both the drastic and non-drastic situation we need to account
for.
Given this, we can, w.l.o.g., write the maximization problem ﬁrm 1 faces:
max
t1
Π1 (S) ≡ max
t1





1 ≥ 0, (IR)
where Π1 (S) is the expected net proﬁto fﬁrm 1.
Given the observability of the eﬀort, each ﬁrm can extract any potential rent from the agent, so




Π1 (S) ≡ max
e1
·





















if β ≤ 2c−1
c
otherwise
where the superscript o stands for "observability of eﬀort". The level of the optimal eﬀort
coincides here with the measure of the probability of success.






























10At this stage we solve for the unconstrained problem, i.e. taking the constraint on the probability
of success as not binding. This way we get the potential unconstrained solution of the maximization
problem. If this solution does not exceed the value of one, given the combination of the parameters
of the model, then it will be used for the following analyses; otherwise, the maximum value of one
will be considered instead8.

















































1−ε (π (βc) − π (c)) − e2 =0 .
They tell us that the solution to the problem should be such that:
eo
1 = eo
2 = eo (M).
We should remember that the constraint over the probability of success not to exceed the value
of one is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee that each agent’s eﬀort will not exceed the value of
one as long as eo (M) ≤ 2
− 1
1−ε. Implementing a higher eo (M) would not lead to a higher probability
of success (and, therefore, to higher expected revenues), but to increased costs as the agents would
eventually have to be compensated for these extra eﬀorts. Using this property, and the one just
found above, we can solve for the system and derive the following result:









We now proceed in characterizing the measure of the probability of success associated with this
case. Remember that, when two agents are kept in the merger, the success probability is a function





1−ε (π (βc) − π(c)),1
o
.











3.1.3 Merger decision under no MH
Firms are willing to merge any time the share of the expected merged entity’s proﬁtt h e ym a y
enjoy is higher than the one they expect in a stand-alone situation. Therefore, to characterize
under which conditions ﬁrms would propose a merger, we need to solve for the following inequality:































The expression of the merged entity’s proﬁt is a function of three diﬀerent parameters, β, c,
and ε. Given the complexity of the expression it is diﬃcult to solve analytically for the values of
these parameters for which the inequality might hold. We therefore use graphical representations
in order to show for which combination of the relevant parameters ﬁrms are willing to merge.
To this purpose, we will ﬁxd i ﬀerent values of the initial cost economy faces and we let the other
parameters vary freely. This will allow us to characterize qualitatively the decision to merge which
will be shown to be taken more often, the lower the initial level of costs. This result can be seen in
ﬁgures 1 and 2.
In the vertical axis diﬀerent values of β ∈ [0,1] are considered: low values of β imply high relative
cost savings, while high levels of it imply the opposite. In the horizontal axis the parameter ε is
represented only for a restricted range such that ε ∈ [−5,5]. We restrict the attention to this
interval for pure descriptive reasons. Extending the range would not add any information on the
ﬁrms’ merger decision as the lines of indiﬀerence will continue asymptotically. In addition, in the
analysis that will follow the interesting results will come in the interval where ε ∈ [−1,1[,s ot h a tw e
will even concentrate on this range to show under which circumstances a competition authority’s
decision may induce a type I or type II error when relying on an eﬃciency defense.
F i r m sa r ea l w a y sw i l l i n gt om e r g e ,n om a t t e rw h i c hi st h ev a l u eo fβ, as long as ε ∈ [0,1[.
This result was partially expected as we know that pure synergies occur in that range. However
a decision to merge may also arise in ranges where pure synergies are not present. This is the












Figure 2: Private merger decision for c =0 .79 under no moral hazard.
case, for values of ε above one where mergers are still privately preferred as long as potential cost
savings are not too high. On the other hand, when ε is negative we might still expect ﬁrms to
merge for high β. The intuition behind this result is that for high β, due to the low implemented
eﬀorts, the probability that no ﬁrm succeeds in inventing the product both, in stand-alone and
in the merger situation, is high. Contrary to the stand-alone situation, in a merger, the ﬁrms
make a positive proﬁt also in the case of a failure of the project. The decision to merge for a low
cost reduction potential is driven by market power considerations. This result contrasts with the
product innovation case considered in Fabrizi and Lippert (2005), where both, in stand-alone and
joint development, a failure means zero proﬁts.
3.2 Moral Hazard
In this section, we will repeat the analysis made for the observable eﬀorts case considering the
eﬀorts as unobservable instead. This is done in order to be able to compare results obtained in the
absence of moral hazard with the ones obtained introducing it into the model and to discuss them.
3.2.1 Stand-alone, (S)
As before, we can write the maximization problem each ﬁrm solves when choosing to conduct the
project alone. In this case, however, we need to remember that, given the moral hazard assumption,
the contract ﬁrms propose to their respective agent has to be incentive compatible. Agents will
receive a transfer higher than the one they would have enjoyed if their eﬀorts were observable.
13Thus, w.l.o.g. we can now write the proﬁt maximization of ﬁrm 1 as follows:
max
b1
Π1 (S) ≡ max
b1





1 ≥ 0 (IR)










Solving for the Nash equilibrium, we get:















where the superscript u stands for "unobservability of eﬀort". As a consequence, the expected
proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm corresponds to:

















T h em e r g e de n t i t yp a y st h es a m eb o n u sb in case of success to both agents9. The non-
observability of agents’ eﬀorts, makes it impossible to separate the contribution one agent has
given to the project from the contribution of the other agent. The merged entity faces again the
(IC) constraint due to the non-observability of agents’ eﬀorts. The (IC) constraint here will result
from the Nash equilibrium of each agent’s utility maximization problem. The (IC) -t h a tw i l lb e
a function of the bonus - can be obtained this way as each agent maximizes his utility considering
that his chosen level of eﬀort will not lead to a probability exceeding one. The merged entity will
have already internalized the feasibility constraint over the probability of success when it chooses
the level of the bonuses. This means that the merged entity will never propose a level of the bonus
that may induce each agent to choose an eﬀort that may lead to a probability exceeding the level
of one10.










i ≥ 0 ∀i (IR)

















9Remember that equal bonuses for both agents would result from cost minimization in equilibrium.
10This would not be feasible anyway, but costly.
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[pu(M)(π(βc) − 2b)+( 1− pu(M))π(c)].
3.2.3 Merger decision under MH



















We have again the same type of complexity as before, so to solve for this inequality we will
proceed with graphical representations in order to describe the combination of the parameters of
the model that will drive the merger decisions of ﬁrms. Diﬀe r e n tv a l u e so ft h ei n i t i a lc o s tw i l lb e
ﬁxed here as well, while the other parameters will be let free to vary.
Figures 3 and 4 show results of the merger decision under moral hazard, for a comparable range
of the parameter ε a si nt h ec a s eo fo b s e r v a b l ee ﬀorts.
As before, in the vertical axis diﬀerent values of β ∈ [0,1] are considered. Again, low values
of β imply high relative cost savings, and high levels of it imply the opposite. The horizontal axis
accounts again for diﬀerent values of the parameter ε in the range [−5,5].
The ﬁrst fact to be noticed is that for a high costs savings potential, ﬁrms are less often willing
to merge. Speciﬁcally, for high initial costs, they do not anymore always merge in the range where
ε ∈ [0,1[. However, as soon as the initial cost is lower a similar behavior can be expected by
ﬁrms: the lower the initial cost the more often they are willing to merge. It can be shown that for
c<0.69, ﬁrms are always willing to merge no matter which values β and ε may take. The rest of
the comments from the observable eﬀorts case apply here as well.
3.3 Comparing private decisions on mergers
Now that we have characterized the private decision on mergers under the assumption of observable
and unobservable agents’ eﬀorts, we can compare these decisions with each other. To do so,
we combine the graphs referred respectively to c =0 .99 and c =0 .79 for both the observable
15β
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Figure 3: Private decision for c =0 .99 under moral hazard.



























Figure 5: Comparison between private decisions for c =0 .99.
and unobservable case, obtaining ﬁgures 5 and 6. In these ﬁgures some proﬁts appear with the
superscript j = o, u.T h i si sd o n ea s ,w h e nc o m b i n i n gﬁgures 3 and 4, there exist regions in which
the decisions about merging stay the same for both assumptions on observability of eﬀorts. Instead,
we highlight the diﬀerences in the behavior of the merging parties as results of this comparison
show that there exist areas where the decision taken under observable eﬀorts does not coincide with
the one taken in the presence of moral hazard. We have two diﬀerent types of these areas. Areas
(a) are the ones where under observable eﬀorts ﬁrms are not willing to merge, but they are instead
under moral hazard. In area (b), arising for values of ε ∈ [−1,1[,t h eo p p o s i t eo c c u r s :ﬁrms are
willing to merge for observable eﬀorts, but not for unobservable ones.
The intuitions for the existence of areas (a) and (b) are as follows. In a merger, it is not anymore
possible to observe the success of each manager separately. This makes it - absent any synergies
- more expensive to implement the same probability of success, and - again absent synergies - a
lower probability of success will be implemented. For the same cost savings potential, therefore, a
lower probability of success is implemented, and it is more often preferred to use the increase in
market power through a merger. This explains (a). At the same time, a higher degree of synergies
is required to compensate for the loss in control over the management, which explains (b). The
eﬀect of (b) was also present in the product innovation case of Fabrizi and Lippert (2005), whereas
the eﬀect of (a) was not.
Proposition 1 If low synergies are present (ε small or bigger than one, i.e. eﬀorts are not close
substitutes), the ﬁrms choose more often to merge under moral hazard than with observable eﬀorts.
For higher synergies (ε around zero, i.e. eﬀorts are close substitutes), the ﬁrms choose less often
to merge under moral hazard than with observable eﬀorts.















Figure 6: Comparison between private decisions for c =0 .79.
4P o l i c y a n a l y s i s
Now that we have determined under which conditions ﬁrms are willing to merge, we need to verify
the impact of their decisions on both the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare depending on
which of them is taken as the objective function by a competition authority. We study the impacts
on both, because competition authorities often seem to care about consumers’ surplus, even though
economists often consider the overall social welfare impact to judge a merger instead.
Several justiﬁcations why a merger authority should care about consumers’ surplus and not
about overall social welfare have been given.
One reason is that, in the decisions a national competition authority has to make on mergers,
only consumers’ surplus should matter given that the proﬁts accruing from a merger might be
enjoyed elsewhere than in the domestic market. This is certainly the case for mergers occurring
between ﬁrms, the respective ownership of which is based abroad. However, this is not a general
case as many mergers may occur between ﬁrms selling their products in a given domestic market
while one of them at least can be held domestically. In these alternative cases, it is not obvious
anymore why the proﬁts of the merging ﬁrms should be disregarded.
Another reason that has been put forward to privilege the consumers’ surplus as an objective
by the competition authorities is that consumers are less likely to coordinate in order to voice their
concerns. The argument implies that they are in a weaker position than merging parties might
be. However, it is not clear why, even if this was the case, this should represent a justiﬁcation
for considering only consumers’ surplus. What we mean with this, is that if consumers cannot
protect themselves from the potentially adverse eﬀects of a merger it does not have to be that the
competition authority has to take a biased point of view favoring them.
One last argument in favor of adopting consumers’ surplus that is often advocated is that it
does not matter whether a competition authority adopts a consumers’ surplus standard instead of
18a social welfare one, as the ﬁrst represents anyhow a good approximation for the second. However,
as results will show, it is not clear whether this is always true. Apart from overstating the role of
consumers as opposed to ﬁrms, consumers’ surplus also neglects another component which might be
crucial in a merger situation: namely the cost of eﬀorts associated with the undertaken project. The
integration eﬀorts that enable the ﬁrms to create synergies come at a cost. It is therefore important
a sw e l lt oc o m p a r ei tw i t ht h ec o s ts e p a r a t eﬁrms will have to encounter when developing projects
alone. In our model, the cost of eﬀort can be interpreted as the cost of development of a given
technology that comes to existence. Such a development cost is not a ﬁxed one though, as it is often
modeled in R&D literature, as we have made it become endogenous through the optimal contracts
implemented before and after the merger.
On the other hand, a tendency of considering a broader objective than the consumers’ surplus
has been observed as well. As Motta (2004) points out:
In the EU, Article 81(3) allows any agreement, decision or concerted practice "which
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting techni-
cal or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting beneﬁt".
Furthermore, Article 2.1 of the Merger Regulation accepts in principle an eﬃciency de-
fense "provided that it is to consumers’ advantage". These provisions might indicate
that consumer welfare is among the ultimate objectives of competition law. However,
I am not aware of any statement of the ECJ on this point, nor of any (Commission or
Court’s) decision where reliance on either standard has made a diﬀerence in practice.
In other jurisdictions, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, competition author-
ities seem instead to lean towards a total welfare standard (Lyons, 2003:3).
In the following subsections, we will deﬁne two measures as proxies of either the enhanced
consumers’ surplus or the social welfare, namely the expected eﬃciency gains, and the reduction in
expected prices.
The way proxies are determined is always disputable. For example, any time prices are weighted
u s i n gad i ﬀerent weight than the exchanged quantities associated to each of them, the measure of
the expected price reductions is not indicative for an enhanced consumers’ surplus. Therefore,
using such a measure as a ’correct’ approximation for the consumers’ surplus would lead to some
errors.
However, as it will become clearer, it is possible to characterize the type of errors that can be
committed when relying on a proxy.
4.1 Objective functions: expected welfare and consumers’ surplus
Before we turn to evaluating the mentioned proxies, let us describe which would be the ideal
decisions if the objective functions expected social welfare and expected consumers’ surplus were
to be followed directly.
Irrespective of the observability of eﬀorts, in the stand-alone case, there are four states of nature
implying three diﬀerent realizations of the consumers’ surplus: both ﬁrms succeed in reducing their
19costs, leading to CSj (βc,βc),n oﬁrm succeeds leading to CSj (c,c) or either one ﬁrm succeeds while
the other one fails, in which case we will have either CSj (βc,c) or CSj (c,βc), respectively, where








1 − pj (S)
¢2
CSj (c,c)+2 pj (S)
¡
1 − pj (S)
¢
CSj (βc,c),
where the superscript j stands for o or u, the observability or unobservability of the agents’ eﬀorts.
In addition to the expected consumers’ surplus, the expected social welfare also includes the
expected gross proﬁts, as well as the agents’ disutility of exerting an eﬀort. Taking this into account,
we can write for the expected social welfare in the pre-merger situation:
Wj (S)=2 pj (S)
¡



















If ﬁrms merge, there are only two states of nature, either the merged ﬁrm succeeds or it does not,
leading to the respective realizations of the consumers’ surplus, CSj (βc) and CSj (c), respectively.
Again, weighted with their probability, we obtain the expression of the expected consumers’ surplus:
CSj (M)=pj (M)CSj (βc)+
¡
1 − pj (M)
¢
CSj (c),
where we use the superscript j as above.
As for the pre-merger case, additionally to the expected consumers’ surplus, the expected social





















Figure 7 represents the impact of a merger on social welfare and consumer’s surplus if eﬀorts are
observable and unobservable, respectively, and for high initial unit production costs, c =0 .99.T h e
CS−CS and W −W lines represent the combinations of β and ε for which a competition authority,
pursuing alternatively the consumers’ surplus or the welfare standard, would be indiﬀerent between
the stand-alone situation and the merger. In addition to these two lines, we again depict the lines
of indiﬀerence between merging and staying alone for the ﬁrms, labelled Π − Π.
In both worlds, the ﬁrms decide to stand-alone to the lower left of the Π−Π line and the welfare
(consumers’ surplus), if ﬁrms merge, is higher than otherwise to the lower right of the W −W line
(the CS−CS line). We see that a consumers’ surplus standard is stricter than a welfare standard
in both worlds, that is also when the agents that are responsible for reducing unit production costs
are able to capture an information rent.
However, the CS−CS and W −W lines are closer to each other when eﬀorts are unobservable.
That means that adopting either standard would make less of a diﬀerence in a world where agents
are subject to moral hazard. On top of this, the Π−Π line also approaches the two lines mentioned






























































































































Figure 7: The ﬁrms’ merger decision and its social welfare and consumers’ surplus impact under
no moral hazard (left) and under moral hazard (right) for c =0 .99
so that the area of a potential conﬂict, i.e. the area where privately preferred mergers are undesired
from either a welfare or a consumers’ surplus point of view, is reduced. This is particularly striking
for high initial unit production costs and not too low potential for their reduction, i.e. for β<0.8.
Furthermore, in the unobservable eﬀorts case with high initial costs, the W − W line crosses
the Π − Π line. This means that there exist welfare increasing potential mergers which would not
be proposed by the merging parties. In this area, the expected welfare is increasing, and both,
expected net proﬁts and expected consumers’ surplus, are falling. This means that there has to be
another component of the expected welfare that compensates: the social cost of the eﬀort exerted
is reduced sensibly.
When the level of the initial cost is lower, the gap between the Π − Π, W − W and CS lines
is in general bigger than for higher initial costs. This is due to a large extent to the increased
proﬁtability of a merger as compared to the stand-alone situation when costs are not initially high.
Opposite to the high initial costs case, i.e. when ﬁrms are more willing to go for a stand-alone
project − as this guarantees them to be the sole beneﬁciary of a high monopoly proﬁt should they
succeed as the only one − lower initial costs make the perspective to merge be more attractive.
Figure 8 shows this.
4.2 Proxies for the society’s objective functions
Once the distinction between the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare has been made, we can
describe the consequences in the characterization of the type of errors a competition authority may
commit when relying on an eﬃciency defense on the basis of proxies.
As for the consumers’ surplus and for the social welfare, we can use the common superscript
j = o,u for each of the components of both the expected eﬃciency and prices in order to account for
































































































Figure 8: The ﬁrms’ merger decision and its social welfare and consumers’ surplus impact under
no moral hazard (left) and under moral hazard (right) for c =0 .79
the observable and the unobservable eﬀorts cases. This is possible as the nature of each component
stays the same through these two environments: the only thing changing is their respective level
as each of them has been obtained solving for diﬀerent optimization problems.
4.2.1 Expected eﬃciency gains
Let us concentrate ﬁrst on the composition of the elements that enter the expected eﬃciency







1 − pj (S)
¢
,
whereas in the merger case:
Ej (M)=pj (M).
These expressions play the equivalent role of the measure of the overall eﬃciency on the produc-
tion side of the economy, respectively when two ﬁrms face a Bertrand competition on the market,
a n dw h e nt h et w oﬁrms merge: they give the probability of producing the good with the low pro-
duction costs βc in the economy. In both these cases we will talk about ex-post eﬃciency, as we
are considering − when writing the expressions the way we are doing − that the privately optimal
induced probabilities of success have been replaced into the expressions of the ex-ante measures of
eﬃciency.
The diﬀerences between the post-merger eﬃciencies and the pre-merger ones, both, under the
no-moral hazard and the moral hazard assumptions, will determine, when positive, whether a
22merger leads to expected eﬃciency gains. If the following inequality holds, we will talk about
eﬃciency gains due to a merger, either when moral hazard is not an issue, or when it is instead:
Ej(M) − Ej(S) > 0
The interest of the analysis is to combine the results of these inequalities, one for each of the
two regimes considered, alternatively with the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare. As argued
in the previous section, in our analysis these two objective functions will be alternatively taken as
a standard by a competition authority when it has to judge upon a proposed merger.
In order to perform the necessary comparisons, we repeat the same type of analyses as the ones
we made when considering the merger decision of ﬁrms, or when we explained the relationships
between the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare as possible objective functions chosen by a
competition authority. Thus, once more, in order to make the relevant graphical comparisons, we
will ﬁxd i ﬀerent values of the initial costs, and we will let the parameters β and ε free to vary11.
Let us take the consumers’ surplus as the reference objective function ﬁrst. Eﬃciency com-
parisons for this objective function can be described using ﬁgures 9 and 10, where the E − E line
depicts, in both, the curve where the diﬀerence between the pre and the post merger expected
eﬃciency is zero. Again, comparisons are made for the observable and the unobservable eﬀorts
cases, and for two levels of the initial costs, a high and a moderate one. Given that when taking
lower levels of the initial costs, the Π − Π curve moves gradually to the left lower corner, and the
CS − CS as well as the E − E lines move to the right lower corner, restricting our attention to
only two levels of the initial costs is enough to describe the main results that can be obtained when
performing this type of comparisons. Note that for any value of the initial cost c,t h eE − E line
always stays above the CS − CS one.
Expected eﬃciency gains due to a merger only occur to the right of the E−E line, i.e. both, in
regions II and IV. However, while region II is not a problematic one as consumers’ surplus increases
too, in region IV consumers’ surplus would decrease due to a permitted merger. Therefore, if an
eﬃciency defense of all the proposed mergers leading to an expected eﬃciency gain was accepted
then type I errors would be made for mergers falling in region IV: bad mergers would be accepted.
Notice that the occurrence of the type I error is reduced, when facing a moral hazard behavior from
the agents’ side: area IV shrinks and the E −E line gets closer to the CS−CS line. The intuition
for this result is that, under moral hazard, ﬁrms go together more often "for the wrong"r e a s o n ,
i.e. for pure market power reasons (compare area (a) in ﬁgures 5 and 6), and less often "for the
right" reason, i.e. for the exploitation of synergies between the agents’ eﬀorts (compare area (b) in
ﬁgures 5 and 6). This is reﬂected both, in the expected eﬃciency and in the consumers’ surplus.
Notice also that requiring a signiﬁcant eﬃciency gain due to a merger, may help reducing the
occurrence of type I error when the society does not face a moral hazard behavior from the agents’
side. The relevant indiﬀerence curve would be to the right of the E − E line so that area IV
would shrink as a result. However, the same recommendation is not a valid one anymore when
11Remember that the relevant comparisons will be made only in the range where ε[−1,1[.














































































































Figure 9: Eﬃciency gains: under consumers’ surplus objective function, for both, observable (left)
and unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .99.
facing a moral hazard behavior instead. The relevant indiﬀerence curve for the application of this
recommendation would lie to the lower right of the E − E line. Thus, using this new indiﬀerence
curve another type of error would arise: a type II error, i.e. some good mergers would be refused
instead. This is true at least when the level of the initial costs that the economy faces is high (see
ﬁgure 9).
We can now repeat the same type of analysis made for the consumers’ surplus, taking the social
welfare as the reference objective function a competition authority may care about. Doing so, we
obtain ﬁgures 11 and 12. As for the case where the consumers’ surplus is the objective function
chosen by the competition authority, we can characterize an area where type I errors are made
when accepting an eﬃciency defense based on an enhanced eﬃciency induced by a merger. This
area is labelled again as area IV, given that it has the same characteristics as before.
It is easy to check that, if social welfare is taken as a standard, the recommendation of having
signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains due to a merger may lead to type II errors both, in a world with and
without moral hazard. Figure 11 shows that, in particular, these errors would be made systemat-
ically when the industry faces high initial costs: good mergers would be more often rejected than
if only enhanced eﬃciency due to a merger were required instead.
Furthermore, under the moral hazard assumption, for values of β below 0.8 the Π − Π, E − E
and W − W lines get closer to each other, up to the point that the E − E crosses the W − W line
and the latter one crosses the Π − Π line instead. This tells us two diﬀerent things. First, that
whenever the potential for cost reduction is not very low, even asking for an enhanced eﬃciency
induced by a merger in order to approve it may be too demanding, in the sense that some mergers
that would have been desirable under the social welfare standard would be rejected. These mergers
are the ones falling in area V. Second, due to the crossing between the W − W and the Π − Π














































































































































Figure 10: Eﬃciency gains: under consumers’ surplus objective function, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .79.
lines, an area VI appears where there exist mergers that would be socially desirable which are not
even privately proposed. These two areas, V and VI, disappear for lower levels of the initial costs
as shown in ﬁgure 12, thus making the requirement of enhanced, or even substantially enhanced,
eﬃciency due to a merger be justiﬁed for lower levels of the initial costs.
To summarize:
Proposition 2 If a competition authority adheres to a (CS) standard and relies on expected eﬃ-
ciency gains for judging proposed mergers:
(i) Under no MH, type I errors are systematically committed, i.e. bad mergers are accepted,
unless signiﬁcant expected eﬃciency gains are required;
(ii) Under MH, type I errors are committed as well, but they occur less often than under the no
MH assumption; for high initial costs the requirement of signiﬁcant expected eﬃciency gains
w o u l dl e a dt ot y p eI Ie r r o r si na d d i t i o n ,i . e .s o m eg o o dm e r g e r sw o u l db er e j e c t e d .
Proposition 3 If a competition authority adheres to a (W) standard and relies on an expected
eﬃciency gains for judging proposed mergers:
(i) Under no MH, type I errors are systematically committed, i.e. bad mergers are accepted, but
they occur less often than when using a (CS) standard. For high initial costs, the signiﬁcant
expected eﬃciency gains requirement would lead to type II errors in addition, i.e. some good
mergers would be rejected;
(ii) Under MH, type I errors are committed for smaller regions than under the (CS) standard,
but type II errors can be committed in addition unless the potential for cost savings is low,


















































































































































Figure 11: Eﬃciency gains: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .99.




























































































































































Figure 12: Eﬃciency gains: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .79.
26i.e. β>0.8. For high and moderate initial cost asking for substantial eﬃciency gains would
lead to refuse some good mergers, i.e. type II errors are committed in addition.
Corollary 4 Under MH, the expected eﬃciency proxy is better calibrated to the objective functions
than under no MH.
Again, the intuition for the corollary is that, under moral hazard, ﬁrms go together more often
"for the wrong" reason, i.e. for pure market power reasons, and less often "for the right"r e a s o n ,
i.e. for the exploitation of synergies between the agents’ eﬀo r t s .T h i si sr e ﬂected in the expected
eﬃciency as well as in the consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
4.2.2 Expected price reductions
We now move to the comparisons concerning possible price reductions due to a merger. In order to
do so, we characterize the expected price under the stand-alone and the merger cases respectively,
replacing the relevant optimal levels of the probabilities of success obtained under each regime.
Thus, the induced expected prices of a stand-alone situation are:





where j = o,u accounts, as before, for both the observable and the unobservable eﬀorts cases.
The induced expected prices by a merger are:
Ej [P(.)] = pj(M)P(βc)+( 1− pj(M))P(c).
When the following is true, a merger induces expected price reductions, either under observable
or unobservable eﬀorts:
Ej [P(.,.)] − Ej [P(.)] > 0
As before, we want to determine the impact over alternatively the consumers’ surplus and the
social welfare of relying on reductions in expected prices when deciding upon proposed mergers.
We use here graphical representations in the same way as before to comment results of these
comparisons.
Figures 13 and 14 show the comparisons when consumers’ surplus is taken as a standard. In
both ﬁgures, the P − P line depicts the frontier between the mergers that do not lead to expected
price reductions − the ones to the left of this line − and the mergers that would lead to reductions
of the expected prices instead − the ones to the right of it.
For high levels of the initial costs, the P − P line intersects the CS − CS o n eb o t hi naw o r l d
with and without moral hazard. The crossing results in the occurrence of two diﬀerent areas,
areas IV and V. The requirement of a reduction in the expected prices induced by a merger would
provoke a type I error for mergers falling in area IV: bad mergers would be accepted, or a type II
error for mergers falling in area V: good mergers would be rejected instead. The reduction of the








































































































































Figure 13: Expected Price: under consumers’ surplus objective function, both, observable (left)
and unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .99.
expected price is too lax a requirement in certain cases, and a too strict one in others. However,
under the moral hazard assumption the occurrence of type I errors in particular is sensibly reduced
when compared to the one under the no moral hazard assumption. For lower values of the initial
costs, the P − P line always lies below the CS − CS line, implying that only type II errors would
eventually be made in these cases by requiring a reduction in the expected price induced by a
merger in order to approve it: all the bad mergers are refused, together with some good ones.
When we perform the parallel analysis using the social welfare as a standard we get ﬁgures 15
and 16. We can conclude that requiring a reduction in the expected price induced by a merger
always leads only to type I errors, as the P − P line always lies below the W − W line no matter
which is the initial level of costs considered, or whether or not we are facing a moral hazard problem
in the industry. The type I error occurs again in the area labelled V.
As has been pointed out in section 4.1, under moral hazard and high initial costs, we have an
area VI, given by the crossing between the W − W and the Π − Π lines, where welfare enhancing
mergers are not proposed by the parties.
To summarize:
Proposition 5 If a competition authority adheres to a (CS) standard and relies on reductions in
the expected prices for judging proposed mergers:
(i) Under no MH, type I and II errors are systematically made for high initial costs: for low β
some bad mergers are accepted and for higher β some good ones rejected. For lower initial
costs, only type II errors are made. The requirement is either too lax or too strict.
(ii) Under MH, type I errors are committed as well, but to a lower extent than under the no MH














































































































































Figure 14: Expected Price: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .99.


















































































































Figure 15: Expected Price: under consumers’ surplus objective function, both, observable (left)
and unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .79.








































































Figure 16: Expected Price: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) eﬀorts, for c =0 .79.
assumption and only for high initial costs. In addition, type II errors are made regardless of
the level of the initial costs, i.e. the requirement is overall too strict.
Proposition 6 If a competition authority adheres to a (W) standard and relies on reductions in
the expected prices for judging proposed mergers: under no MH and MH assumptions, type II errors
are systematically committed, i.e. some good mergers are rejected regardless of the level of the initial
costs.
Corollary 7 Under MH, the expected price proxy is better calibrated to the objective functions than
under no MH.
The same intuition applies as the one for the expected eﬃciencies: under moral hazard, ﬁrms
go together more often "for the wrong" reason, i.e. for pure market power reasons, and less often
"for the right" reason, i.e. for the exploitation of synergies between the agents’ eﬀorts. This is
reﬂected in the expected prices as well as in the consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
4.3 Policy implications
Up to now, our analysis has focussed on the positive side of evaluating mergers using simple proxies
such as expected eﬃciency gains or reductions in the expected prices.
We have argued that a proxy leads to errors as it cannot perfectly substitute for the real
objective function. In this paper we have provided a characterization of the type of errors that
might be committed when using these proxies, under two diﬀerent regimes, i.e. with and without
moral hazard. This characterization has been made in terms of parameters such as the potential
for innovation, β, the type of the joint project, ε, and the level of the initial costs of the industry,
30c. Implicitly, we thereby also provided suggestions about which combination of these parameters
do not lead to commit systematically errors of either type I or II.
At this point, we would like to go back to the criticism related to the use of proxies, such as
expected eﬃciency gains and price reductions, as substitutes for either the consumers’ surplus or
the social welfare. If the use of these proxies helps giving some precise recommendation about
which mergers to accept and which ones to refuse, then they may be used whenever they may allow
to save on information to be collected and processed.
If a measure for these proxies could be constructed using the partial information that a compe-
tition authority may have access to, on the basis of the results obtained, we could conclude which
is the potential danger in adopting one proxy instead of another as a function of the characteristics
of the industry the merger is concerned with.
As an example, whenever the industry faces a moral hazard behavior from the agents’ side, the
potential for innovation is not too low, and the initial costs are high, then the expected eﬃciency
gains would be a good statistic for the ’real’ objective function pursued by a competition authority
when deciding whether a proposed merger should be rejected or not. In this particular case, the
collection of data to construct a precise measure for that proxy may result to be not as essential to
judge upon the likelihood for the merger to lead to an improvement from both the social welfare
and the consumers’ surplus point of views. We know that in this case both consumers’ surplus and
social welfare induced by a proposed merger would be enhanced.
Whenever the initial costs are lower, no matter whether we face moral hazard or not, expected
eﬃciency gains should be proved instead. In this case, the collection of data to construct an as
precise measure of the proxy as possible may be crucial in deciding upon the merger. This is
particularly true as long as the standard is the (CS). Furthermore, the lower the initial costs the
more substantial the expected eﬃciency gains should be.
These are only some general implications that are directly coming from the results we have
obtained in our analysis. Depending on the real objective of the competition authority and the
parameters characterizing the industry, one or another proxy, or diﬀerent combinations of them,
could be alternatively preferred and constructed to adapt them and use them ’quanto basta’i n
order to ﬁt real merger cases decisions.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The wave of horizontal mergers that has occurred in this last decade, has opened a debate about the
eﬀects of mergers in their respective markets. On the one hand, worries have been voiced about the
potential increase in market power, concentration, therefore decreased degree of competitiveness in
these markets due to mergers. On the other hand, arguments in favor of mergers have been put
forward, stressing their potential virtues, as their ability to create eﬃciency gains, coming from
reduced production costs, transaction costs, or internal organization costs.
We have built a model where merger decisions and their potential eﬃciency gains are endoge-
nized. The channel we propose and analyze has been formed by interactions of agents’ eﬀorts when
they are devoted to a joint project within a merger as compared to when each agent has to conduct
31the same project alone. We have shown this way that mergers happen either when the potential
for cost reduction is low, i.e. out of pure market power considerations, or when managerial eﬀorts
are close substitutes, or alternatively slight duplicates, when ex-post synergies, i.e. induced by
implemented contracts, are present. Synergies are the results of both the interaction between these
agents’ eﬀorts and the implemented contracts that drive the proﬁtability of mergers, and determine
the impact on consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
R e s u l t st e l lu st h a ta ne ﬃciency defense based on potential eﬃciency gains due to a merger
is generally too lax a requirement − some bad mergers would be accepted − for the observable
eﬀorts case, and, for both informational assumptions, when the initial costs are not too high. In
these cases, requiring substantial eﬃciency gains may reduce this distortion. Results also show that
requiring the same for either the unobservable case when initial costs are high, or for a larger range
of costs when the standard used is the social welfare, may be too strict: some good mergers would
be refused. In any case when eﬀorts are unobservable, this requirement is more aligned to either
type of standards.
We have also shown that the alternative requirement of comparing prices before and after the
merger, which would require to have additional information processed from the demand side, turns
out not to be necessary. The measure of the expected eﬃciency gains can be precise enough when
adjusted in the right way: using it ’quanto basta’.
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